The presenter discusses the preliminary NTSB report regarding the fatal 21 Air crash in Miami. He details the flight parameters and crew actions.
What the video covers
Written in our own words. It only describes what the video shows and says.NTSB preliminary report and approach details
The presenter reviews the preliminary report from the NTSB regarding the 21 Air flight 7598 crash at Miami International Airport on the 6th of September. The Boeing 767, operating for Amazon Prime Air, impacted an Econoline van and a Toyota Corolla Cross after overrunning runway 30, resulting in five fatalities and three serious injuries on the ground. According to the presenter, the report confirms the captain was the pilot flying and the first officer was the pilot monitoring. The aircraft crossed the runway threshold at 105 feet above ground level with a ground speed of 177 knots. The presenter notes that the initial touchdown occurred 3,750 feet past the threshold at 160 knots. The weight on wheels switch only activated intermittently because the aircraft bounced, preventing the deployment of the spoilers and the use of thrust reversers. The aircraft eventually crossed the departure end of the runway at 113 knots and came to a stop 1,200 feet from the paved surface.
Crew experience and weather factors
The presenter outlines the flight experience of the crew members based on their interviews with NTSB investigators. The fifty-five-year-old captain had accrued 7,267 total flight hours but only held 150 hours in the Boeing 767, having received his type rating a few months prior in May. The first officer had 2,800 total flight hours with 800 hours in the accident aircraft type. The video then addresses the meteorological conditions during the approach. The presenter explains that the weather shifted from calm winds to a quartering tailwind of 26 knots shortly before the landing. The local air traffic controller cleared the flight to land but did not issue the updated wind information to the crew. The presenter states that providing this wind data is an FAA requirement when a tailwind component exists, noting that the controller had provided the updated winds to another aircraft on a different frequency four minutes earlier.
Missed go-around opportunities and cockpit configuration
The presenter details a timeline of the approach, highlighting numerous instances where the crew failed to initiate a mandatory go-around. The first officer repeatedly cautioned the captain about their excessive speed, but the captain did not provide a consistent verbal response. The aircraft received multiple electronic warnings, including sink rate and terrain alerts, as it descended rapidly from 500 feet to 100 feet in four seconds. The presenter observes that the captain only called for a go-around fifteen seconds before the aircraft went off the end of the runway. Finally, the presenter describes a photograph of the cockpit taken after the crash. The image shows that the speed brakes remained stowed and the thrust reversers were only in the first detent. The fire handles had been pulled to dispense the extinguishers into the engines. The presenter points out that the flap handle was found in the 25 detent, indicating the flaps were never fully extended to 30 degrees as requested by the captain just before touchdown.
