A Pegasus Airlines Airbus A321neo turned the wrong way onto a runway at Frankfurt Airport on Tuesday evening, 20 October. Operating flight PC996 to Istanbul Sabiha Gökçen, the aircraft was due to depart from runway 18, which is only used for southbound departures. When it entered the runway it turned right instead of left and ended up facing north12. ADS-B data shows the A321neo then moved about 700 metres north along the runway, at a recorded groundspeed of up to 31 knots, before turning off again3. Six minutes later it departed, this time in the right direction3.

Right instead of left

Pegasus confirms that the aircraft, A321neo TC-RDO, turned the wrong way as it entered the runway: it should have turned left and went right. According to the airline, the flight crew noticed the error themselves and brought the aircraft to a stop. In coordination with the tower it vacated the runway, then entered it again and took off1. Pegasus says there was no take-off attempt, and that reports of the tower preventing a take-off in the wrong direction are untrue1. Speaking to aero.de, the airline stressed that a wrong turn when entering the runway is not the same as an attempt to take off in the wrong direction. It said the event was reported under standard safety procedures and is being reviewed4.

The Aviation Herald, citing radio communications, described a different sequence: the crew began to accelerate northbound and rejected the take-off at around 35 knots after air traffic control called them2. German air navigation service provider DFS confirmed the event was reported to the competent authorities. Whether and to what extent there will be an investigation is a matter for the German accident investigation bureau, the BFU, DFS said24.

What the ADS-B data shows

The aircraft's Mode S code belongs to an Airbus A321-251NX registered to Pegasus5. On the evening of the event it flew with the callsign PGT56HD3. At around 17:55 local time it taxied west from the eastern side of the airport towards the Startbahn West, reaching the runway at 18:02 where taxiway S joins it32. At 18:03:34 it was moving north along the runway at 31 knots, about 58 km/h, the highest speed the transponder reported in this phase3.

Half a minute later the aircraft was down to 11 knots and turned right off the runway, roughly 700 metres north of taxiway S and about 530 metres before the northern end of the runway36. By 18:05 it had stopped beside the runway3. The next departure, a Pilatus PC-12, was already waiting at taxiway S. It started its take-off roll southbound shortly after 18:04, just after the A321neo had left the runway, so it was moving away from the Pegasus jet73. The data shows no traffic heading towards the A321neo on the runway.

The Pegasus aircraft taxied back to taxiway S via the taxiways east of the runway. At 18:09 it was lined up there, now pointing south. A few seconds later it began its take-off roll and was airborne within a minute3. The flight to Istanbul then continued without any emergency squawk. At around 21:23 Turkish time the aircraft was descending over the Sea of Marmara towards Istanbul3.

Why the direction matters so much

Frankfurt has four runways. Both take-offs and landings use the two parallel east-west runways, the Centre runway (07C/25C) and the South runway (07R/25L). The Northwest runway (07L/25R) is for landings only. The Startbahn West (18), a 4,000-metre north-south runway, is for take-offs only, and only towards the south86. According to aeroTELEGRAPH, taxiway S joins the runway about 1,260 metres from its start2. Turning left there leaves just over 2.7 kilometres of runway ahead, based on the threshold coordinates. Turning right leaves about 1.25 kilometres to the end of the runway6.

Confirming runway and direction before lining up

ICAO published Doc 9870, its Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions, in 20079. In Europe, EUROCONTROL built on it with the EAPPRI action plan, which has since been superseded by the global action plan GAPPRI, published in August 2024109. GAPPRI explicitly lists a take-off in the wrong direction from an intersection as one of the situations airlines need to protect their crews against9.

Its recommendation is that operators have policies, technical solutions or SOPs that confirm the aircraft is using the correct intersection and lining up on the planned runway, for example by confirming both out loud. GAPPRI gives the example of a pilot calling out "RWY 08R, Intersection A4, identified" before line-up. Crews should also check that the aircraft heading is reasonable for the runway they are cleared to depart from. An electronic airport moving map, the Runway Awareness and Advisory System (RAAS) or Airbus's Take-Off Securing function can provide extra support9.

Much of this comes down to CRM. Under GAPPRI, each flight crew member should independently hear the three parts of any runway clearance: callsign, clearance and runway. Any doubts must be resolved immediately, and if there is uncertainty, crews should ask for confirmation of the clearance before entering the runway9. For more on how authority and teamwork interact on the flight deck, read the Delta Connection DL5090 case and how the roles of captain and first officer differ.

Lessons from earlier events

Comair flight 5191 showed in 2006 how serious the consequences can be. The crew had been cleared for runway 22 at Lexington, Kentucky, but lined up on runway 26 and began the take-off roll. The aircraft ran off the end of the runway and 49 people died. The NTSB found that the crew did not use the available cues and aids to identify the aircraft's position on the airport, and did not cross-check that the aircraft was on the correct runway before take-off11. A recent example of how much a runway's length matters during a rejected take-off is the Falcon 50 runway excursion in Las Vegas.

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