India's Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau (AAIB) has found that Garg Aviation, the flying training organisation (FTO) whose Tecnam P2006T crashed near Kanpur on 27 August 2026, did not comply with the regulator's requirements for monitoring training flights1. The finding appears in the bureau's preliminary report, released on 28 September, which also contains an interim safety recommendation that reaches beyond this operator to other FTOs2. The report does not determine the cause of the accident, and the AAIB stresses that its information "is preliminary and subject to change"1.

The training flight

The aircraft, registered VT-NBV, was planned for local flying for an exercise on abnormal and emergency procedures, with the school's Deputy Chief Flight Instructor and a trainee pilot on board1. VT-NBV took off at around 1111 IST1. According to the statement of the radio controller cited in the report, at approximately 1125 IST the aircraft made a radio call reporting "Ops Normal" and said it would call again after 10 minutes1. No further call was received, and attempts by the controller and by other aircraft to make contact went unanswered1. At 1150 IST the Chief Flight Instructor took off in another aircraft with a fellow instructor to check on VT-NBV visually1. The report states that "No distress call was made by the aircraft."1

At 1210 IST the operator received information that the aircraft had force landed in the Ganga Barrage area, about 4.85 NM northwest of the Civil Aerodrome at Kanpur1. Police officials told investigators that local residents had reported the crash through the 112 helpline, and police and ambulance personnel took both occupants to hospital in Kanpur, where they were declared dead1. Kanpur police identified them as instructor Sachin Bhatia and trainee pilot Abhishek Pujari34. The aircraft was destroyed by the impact and there was no fire1. "The circumstances and cause of the accident will be determined through the investigation," the regulator said3. Early police accounts put the take-off at around 11.30 am, while the AAIB gives the accident time as 1130 IST approximately41.

No records of flight data monitoring

The P2006T was not fitted with a cockpit voice recorder or a digital flight data recorder, but its Garmin G950 glass cockpit records flight data1. The AAIB points to Flying Training Circular 01 of 2022, "Monitoring of Training in Flying Training Organizations", which the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) issued to strengthen its oversight of flying and ground training at FTOs1. The bureau says the FTO "has not complied with the requirements laid down in this circular."1 When investigators asked about flight data monitoring, the school said random monitoring of Garmin data was being carried out, but "no records of such monitoring were maintained, and there was no SOP defining how the monitoring was conducted or what exceedance limits were considered for it."1 The AAIB has not linked this finding to the cause of the crash2.

On that basis, the bureau recommends that DGCA "may issue directions to M/s Garg Aviation and other FTOs to strictly adhere to the Flight Data Monitoring requirements stipulated in FTC 01 of 2022."1 It also suggests that DGCA issue specific guidelines detailing the procedure for flight data monitoring, to be made part of the Training and Procedures Manual (TPM)15. Under the AAIB's safety recommendation process, a regulator that receives a safety recommendation is required to inform the bureau, within ninety days, of the preventive action taken or under consideration, or of the reasons why no action will be taken6.

Earlier warnings and the school's suspension

According to official communications reviewed by PTI, the DGCA on 10 July 2026 circulated to FTOs safety recommendations from the AAIB's investigation into the 12 May 2022 crash of a Tecnam P2006T operated by FSTC Flying School at Bhiwani in Haryana7. That communication said "Greater emphasis should be placed on training for handling emergency situations, particularly during critical phases of flight on Tecnam aircraft"7. Separately, after a trainee pilot was injured at Kanpur in June during a night instructional flight, the DGCA de-rostered a Garg Aviation instructor and grounded the aircraft, the Hindustan Times reported3.

In a report published on 16 September, the Hindustan Times said the civil aviation ministry had suspended Garg Aviation's operations "until further notice", citing people aware of the matter8. "The DGCA (Directorate General of Civil Aviation) has suspended the FTO's operations on the ministry's direction," a ministry official told the newspaper8. The step followed a letter from the Associations of Flight training Organisation (AFTO) seeking a monitored investigation into its allegations against the school, and the association said it had submitted 14 complaints to the DGCA since November 20248. The allegations are the association's, and the newspaper said Garg Aviation had not immediately responded to its request for comment8.

What the investigation is examining

The report also lists the weather records for the morning: visibility observed at the aerodrome was 5,000 metres at 0500 UTC, and Kanpur Air Force station issued advisories for the period, including a weather warning for thunderstorm with rain and mist for 0430 to 0530 UTC1. The preliminary report sets out these observations without analysing them or linking them to the accident1. Investigators have downloaded the data from the Garmin data card recovered from the wreckage and are analysing it1. Both Rotax engines have been retrieved and quarantined for detailed examination, with the team coordinating with the original equipment manufacturer1. Italy's ANSV and the US NTSB have each appointed an accredited representative, together with a technical adviser from Tecnam1. Once the analysis is complete, the AAIB drafts a final report with its conclusions and safety recommendations, consults the states involved and publishes the accepted report on its website9.

What this means for student pilots

The report sets out the crew's experience: the instructor held a commercial pilot licence with more than 3,337 hours in total and more than 283 hours on type, while the trainee held a student pilot licence with more than 199 hours, four of them on the P2006T1. If DGCA acts on the recommendation, schools would be expected to follow a documented procedure for reviewing the flight data their aircraft already record1. Prospective students can reasonably ask any school how it monitors training flights and whether that process is written down. The DGCA has separately issued guidelines on agreements between flying schools and trainees, covered in our report on Flying Training Circular 02 of 2026.